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THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO REFILE:
A PLAIN MEANING INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 24a OF THE ILLINOIS
LIMITATIONS ACT-FRANZESE V. TRINKO
Section 24a of the Illinois Limitations Act 1 provides a plaintiff with
an opportunity to refile a complaint after dismissal, even if the original limitations period has expired. This right to refile is available to
the plaintiff in four instances: (1) after a dismissal for want of prosecution (DWP); (2) after a voluntary dismissal; (3) when the plaintiff's
judgment has been reversed on appeal; and (4) when, upon matter
alleged in arrest of judgment, judgment is entered against the plaintiff.2 Relief under this section is conditioned upon the plaintiff refiling within one year of the date of dismissal or within the time re3
maining in the statute of limitations, whichever is greater.
This section traditionally has been read by the courts to enable
only diligent plaintiffs to refile. Recently, however, section 24a was
interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Franzese v. Trinko 4 to
allow all cases dismissed for want of prosecution to be refiled under
the section, regardless of the plaintiff's diligence in prosecution of the
suit.
In Franzese, the plaintiff filed suit for personal injuries sustained in
an automobile accident. At a special call of the docket, 'One and onehalf years after the plaintiff's initial filing, the suit was dismissed for

1. Section 24a provides:
In the actions specified in this Act or any other act or contract where the time for
commencing an action is limited, if judgment is given for the plaintiff but reversed
on appeal; or if there is a verdict for the plaintiff and, upon matter alleged in arrest
of judgment, the judgment is given against the plaintiff; or the action is voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiff, or the action is dismissed for want of prosecution then,
whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires during the pendency of such suit, the plaintiff, his heirs, executors or administrators may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation,
whichever is greater, after such judgment is reversed or given against the plaintiff,
or after the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff or the action is dismissed
for want of prosecution.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24a (Supp. 1976).

2. Of the four categories in section 24a, two rarely are utilized by plaintiffs. The first is the
situation in which "judgment is given for the plaintiff but reversed on appeal." The second
category is the situation when a verdict is given for the plaintiff, "and, upon matter alleged in
arrest of judgment, the judgment is given against the plaintiff." For an analysis of the case law
background to these categories, see Comment, The Illinois Savings Statute: An Analysis of Section 2 4a of Chapter 83, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 465, 465 n.2 (1976).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. 66 Ill.2d 136, 361 N.E.2d 585 (1977).
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want of prosecution. 5 The plaintiff refiled under the DWP provision
of section 24a. The defendant opposed the refiling, alleging extreme
lack of diligence on the part of. the plaintiff in prosecution of his suit
and citing the judicially-created diligence requirement of section
24a. 6 The trial court ruled against the plaintiff and the appellate
court affirmed, 7 citing not only the failure to comply with a local

5. The appellate court noted that "the case appeared on the docket pursuant to a local
court rule." Franzese v. Trinko, 38 I11.
App.3d 152, 153, 347 N.E.2d 844, 846 (2d Dist. 1976).
The specific rule was mentioned by the appellate court in a footnote:
The 19th Judicial Circuit Rule 4.2 "Automatic Call of Dockets" which provides generally that cases shall be set for trial within nine months after filing and in the event
this is not done the clerk shall notify the parties that the case will be called on a
day certain "on which day it will be dismissed on motion of the court, except for
good cause shown. Failure to appear shall constitute acknowledgement of the dismissal." The instruction sheet accompanying the special progress call specifically
provided that if no action were taken on or before November 21, 1973, the cases
would be dismissed on motion of the court.
Id. at 153-54 n.1, 347 N.E.2d at 846 n.1.
6. The exception to section 24a's right to refile dates back to Lamson v. Hutchings, 118 F.
321 (7th Cir. 1902), in which the court noted that paragraph 25 of the act of July 1, 1873 (2
Starr. & C. Ann. St. p. 2642, c. 83, par. 25) (the forerunner to section 24a) was designed to aid
the "diligent but mistaken claimant." Id. at 323 (emphasis added). Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the exception over the years. See, e.g., Sandman v. Marshall Field & Co., 27 I11.
App.3d 427, 430, 326 N.E.2d 514, 516 (1st Dist. 1975) ("whether in a given instance ...
section 24a authorizes refiling of a suit depends on the history of the litigation and whether that
history is compatible with the object and spirit of section 24a"); Brown v. Burdick, 16 I11.
App.3d 1071, 1074, 307 N.E.2d 409, 411 (2d Dist. 1974) (a plaintiff whose lack of diligence
amounted to a "virtual abandonment of his cause of action" cannot avail himself of the provisions of section 24a); Quirino v. Chicago Tribune-New York News Syn., Inc., 10 Ill.
App.3d
148, 150, 294 N.E.2d 29, 31 (1st Dist. 1973) ("Section 24a was not intended as a refuge for the
negligent but only as an aid for the diligent."); Ray v. Bokorney, 133 I11.
App.2d 141, 145, 272
N.E.2d 836, 840 (1st Dist. 1971) ("The trial court and a court of review are not precluded from
viewing the history of the litigation to determine if section 24a has been abused and relied upon
contrary to its object, spirit and meaning.").
A liberal construction of section 24a can be traced back to its statutory origin, the English
Limitations Act of 1623. The relevant portion of the act reads:
If in any of the said actions or suits, judgment be given for the plaintiff, and the
same be reversed by error, or a verdict pass for the plaintiff, and upon matter
alleged in arrest of judgment the judgment be given against the plaintiff, that he
take nothing by his plaint, writ, or bill; or if any of the said actions shall be brought
by original, and the defendant therein be outlawed, and shall after reverse the
outlawry; that in all such cases the party plaintiff, his heirs, executors or administrators, as the case shall require, may commence a new action or suit, from time to
time, within a year after such judgment reversed, or such judgment reversed, or
such given against the plaintiff, or outlawry reversed and not after.
21 Jac. 1, c. 16, § 4 (1623). The act was extended to cases not strictly within its letter by the
English case of Swindell v. Bulkeley, 18 Q.B.D. 250 (1886). Thus a judicially innovative construction of section 24a is grounded in the distant past.
7. 38 I11.
App.3d 152, 347 N.E.2d 844 (2d Dist. 1976).
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court rule, but also the serious lack of diligence evidenced in the
record. 8

The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing the lower courts, held
that no exception may be read into section 24a. The court used a
canon of construction that required statutes to be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning. 9 In specifically overruling the judicially-created exception to section 24a which once
made the statute unavailable to plaintiffs lacking in diligence, Franzese created an absolute right to refile a case that has been dismissed
for want of prosecution. 10
8. The seriousness of plaintiff's lack of diligence can best be illustrated by quoting the
appellate court's examination of the record:
In this case the court could thus properly conclude on the whole record of the
litigation that the plaintiff was not within the objective and spirit of Section 24 of
the Limitations Act and could not, therefore, claim a right to refile under its terms.
He filed his first complaint only thirteen days prior to the expiration of the two year
statute of limitations provided for personal injury actions. He did not respond to a
discovery order until a second order was entered on June 11, 1973, approximately
one year after the first order. He then did nothing until the day prior to the court
call on November 21, 1973. Even accepting his own explanation which was contradicted by defendant's counsel, plaintiff's counsel did not offer any reasonable
justification for either not appearing at the automatic call of the docket in accordance with local rules or for not having another attorney appear on his behalf. In
fact, the common law record shows the general appearance of local counsel. No
explanation for the non-appearance of co-counsel at the call of the docket has been
offered. There is no record that plaintiff, at any time, sought to vacate the original
order of dismissal or to appeal from it. After the cause was dismissed plaintiff did
not refile his case until eleven months and one week later, approximately three
weeks prior to the expiration of the limitations period provided for refiling under
section 24. And he offered no reasonable excuse for either the delay in prosecuting
his initial action or for the delay in refiling. Under these circumstances we will not
interfere with the court's ruling.
38 Ill. App.3d at 155, 347 N.E.2d at 847.
9. See note 13 infra.
10. The automatic right to refile applies to any case that has been dismissed for want of
prosecution. See, e.g., Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Corp., 66 Ill.2d 616, 621, 363 N.E.2d 796, 798
(1977) (Dooley, J., specially concurring). Often a DWP is entered at a special call of the docket.
See 66 Ill.2d at 619, 363 N.E.2d at 798. Though the vehicle for such a dismissal may be a local
court rule, the real basis is the inherent power to dismiss for lack of diligence. Illinois case law
emphasizes that this inherent power exists without limitation by any statute or rule. Epley v.
Epley, 328 I11.582, 160 N.E. 113 (1928); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Chapin, 226 I11.499, 80
N.E. 1017 (1907); Hogan v. Braudon, 40 I11. App.3d 352, 352 N.E.2d 303 (2d Dist. 1976);
Crawford v. Crawford, 39 Ill. App.3d 457, 350 N.E.2d 103 (1st Dist. 1976); Ryan v. Dixon, 28
Ill. App.3d 463, 328 N.E.2d 672 (2d Dist. 1975).
Defendants may attempt to limit Franzese to its facts by contending that the absolute right
to refile applies only to a DWP entered pursuant to 19th Judicial Circuit Rule 4.2. This position
is untenable, however, for the language of the decision is far-reaching. Nowhere in its opinion
does the supreme court even mention the local court rule. The only reference to the type of
DWP in Franzese was the quotation of the circuit court order referring generally to the special
call of the docket. 66 Ill.2d at 137, 361 N.E.2d at 586.
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The purpose of this Note is to show: (1) the weakness of Franzese's
justification for the plain meaning approach; (2) the adverse consequences for defendants; (3) the limited alternatives available to defendants to prevent such consequences; and (4) the logic of restoring a
remedial interpretation to section 24a.
THE COURT'S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PLAIN MEANING RULE

The supreme court placed exclusive reliance on a single canon of
construction, the plain meaning rule, as justification for its decision.
However, in the absence of a policy analysis of the particular statute
in question, a canon of construction is of little value because such
canons are susceptible to manipulation. In fact, commentators have
noted a pattern in case law in which justifications and criticisms of the
plain meaning rule can be symmetrically counterpointed."
Illinois case law discussing the plain meaning rule can be
categorized into pairs of opposing theories. The court's selection of a
particular theory appears to be more a matter of convenience than a
recognition of one theory as superior to its opposite. 12 The equivaThe supreme court's lengthy discussion and overruling of Tidwell v. Smith, 57 Ill. App.2d
271, 205 N.E.2d 484 (1965), is further evidence that Franzese applies to all types of dismissals
for want of prosecution. In examining the case law basis for the exception to section 24a, the
supreme court found Tidwell to be the origin of all appellate court cases supporting the diligence requirement. 66 Ill.2d at 138, 361 N.E.2d at 586. Tidwell involved a general DWP
independent of any court rule or statute. The supreme court's entire discussion of Tidwell
would hare been irrelevant if the supreme court meant to limit its decision to DWPs entered
pursuant to the circuit court rule. The court framed its analysis around the entire DWP provision of section 24a, not just one type of DWP. The court referred generally to the "language of
section 24 concerning a dismissal for want of prosecution," and made no mention of any limitation upon its holding. Id. at 139-40, 361 N.E.2d at 587.
11. Llewellyn first used this technique in analyzing New York appellate court decisions.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
12. Nichols, Some Aspects of Statutory Interpretation, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 127h-132, Introduction XXIII-XV (Smith-Hurd 1953). The following pairs of opposing canons were constructed
from an examination of Illinois case law on statutory interpretation:
(1) The wording of a statute is mandatory. City of Darien v. Dublinski, 16 Ill. App.3d 140,
145, 304 N.E.2d 769, 773 (2d Dist. 1973). The wording of a statute is directory only. Id. The
fact that both theories appeared in the same case demonstrates the relative ease with which
courts choose a canon which they find convenient.
(2) Courts must give effect to plain meaning regardless of consequences. Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Products Co., 36 Ill, App.3d 411, 415, 343 N.E.2d 530, 534 (1st Dist. 1976). Courts
should avoid absurd, mischievous, or unjust consequences. Board of Educ. of Williamsville
Community Unit School Dist. No. 15 v. Brittin, 11 Ill.2d 411, 414, 143 N.E.2d 555, 557 (1957);
Herrington v. County of Peoria, 11 111. App.3d 7, 10, 295 N.E.2d 729, 731 (3d Dist. 1973).
(3) Courts are not to read into a statute; the plain language controls. Belfield v. Coop, 8
Ill.2d 293, 307, 134 N.E.2d 249, 256 (1956); Hagen v. City of Rock Island, 18 Il.2d 174, 179,
163 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1959). The object, spirit and intent of a statute control over the letter
when a conflict arises. Inskip v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 26 Ill.2d 501, 510, 187
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lency of such opposing theories is not openly acknowledged by the
courts. This is because the accepted forms of legal argumentation involve a skill in being able to argue forcefully either side of any issue
as if only one correct position could exist.13 Even the cases cited by
the Illinois Supreme Court in support of the plain meaning rule are
internally inconsistent in applying that rule. 14
Underlying the plain meaning canon is a static approach to separation of powers. According to Franzese, the purpose behind the plain
meaning approach is to articulate and apply the intent of the legislature. Since the legislative body as rulemaker presents its final decision to the public in the form of laws, the legislative intent is allegedly contained only in the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute,
and to ignore that plain meaning is supposedly to exceed the constitutional power granted to the judiciary. 15 Thus the separation of powN.E.2d 201, 206 (1962); Tidwell v. Smith, 57 Ill. App.2d 271, 274-75, 205 N.E.2d 484, 486 (2d
Dist. 1965).
(4) Legislative intention is to be ascertained from the plain meaning of a statute. General
Motors Corporation, Fisher Body Division v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill.2d 106, 112, 338
N.E.2d 561, 564 (1975); Western Nat'l Bank v. Village of Kildeer, 19 1Il.2d 342, 350, 167
N.E.2d 169, 173 (1961). In determining legislative intention, the courts may consider not only
language, but the evil to be remedied and the object to be attained. People v. Bratcher, 63
III.2d 534, 543, 349 N.E.2d 31, 35 (1976); People v. Dednam, 55 Ill.2d 565, 568, 304 N.E.2d
627, 629 (1973).
13. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about
How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
14. In Western Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill.2d 342, 167 N.E.2d 169
(1973), the court declared that it must follow the plain language of the statute in question; later
in the opinion, however, the court makes the distinction between "mandatory" and "directory"
in identifying certain express statutory provisions as requiring strict compliance or condoning
noncompliance. Id. at 348-49, 167 N.E.2d at 173. In Droste v. Kerner, 34 ll.2d 495, 217
N.E.2d 73 (1966), the court embraces the plain meaning rule but then allows an exception to
the statute's plain meaning when legislative intent is to the contrary. Id. at 504, 217 N.E.2d at
79.
15. The Illinois Supreme Court's rationale for eliminating the diligence requirement of section 24a is based on the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches:
The language of a statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. "It isa
primary rule in the interpretation and construction of statutes that the intention of
the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. [Citations omitted.] This is to
be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained
therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for
construction. [Citations omitted.] There is no rule of construction which authorizes
a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the
statue imports." Western Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer, 19 1ll.2d
342, 350, 167 N.E.2d 169, 173 [1961].
The language of section 24 concerning a dismissal for want of prosecution is clear
and unambiguous. "Courts have no legislative powers, and their sole function is to
determine and, within the constitutional limits of the legislative power, give effect
to the intention of the lawmaking body. We will not and cannot inject provisions
not found in a statute, however desirable or beneficial they may be." (Droste v.
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ers rationale views the reading of qualifications into a statute as a
judicial usurpation of legislative authority.
Despite the logic of such an approach to statutory interpretation,
this separation of powers rationale is not supported by precedent.
The courts of Illinois have long recognized that the judiciary has the
16
constitutional power to disregard the literal meaning of a statute.
Moreover, the separation of powers rationale for the plain meaning
rule has been specifically rejected by the courts. Several landmark
Illinois Supreme Court decisions emphasize that it is proper for a
judge to exercise legislative powers as well as judicial powers to remedy gaps or defects in the law. 1 7 The separation of powers doctrine
is to be understood in a limited and qualified sense; in reality, a
"blending . . . and admixture of different powers" in the operation of
the judicial branch is proper so long as "the whole power shall not be
lodged in the same hands."'
When a court fashions a remedy that
is inconsistent with a statute's plain meaning, it is thus exercising the
"admixture of powers" that is essential for effective judicial decisionmaking. This is by no means an unconstitutional disregard of legislative intent.
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENDANTS

Recognition of the diligence exception is justified when one considers the sort of delays occasioned by plaintiffs. For example, the trial
court in Franzese found that the plaintiff was guilty of "extreme and
self-initiated delay" in prosecution of his suit because he continually
waited until the last permissible moment to pursue his case and did
not respond to several court orders. 19
Kerner, 34 Ill.2d 495, 504, 217 N.E.2d 73, 79 [1961].) We find no basis for engrafting upon section 24 an intent on the part of the General Assembly to exclude
from its ambit all but the "'diligent suitor."
66 Ill.2d at 139-40, 361 N.E.2d at 587.
16. The following cases demonstrate the use of judicial innovation to fashion a remedy not
included in the literal meaning of a statute in order to meet the ends of justice: Spring v. Little,
50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972) (court implied a warranty of habitability in literal violation
of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute even though the statute contained no wording which
specifically allowed a defendant to sustain the defense of breach of warranty of habitability);
Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955) (court fashioned remedy to avoid dictates of
and thereby qualify survivorship statute when husband murders wife); Heck v. Schupp, 394 I11.
296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1947) (court granted relief to allow husband to sue wife's lover for loss of
her society and assistance even though this relief was in literal violation of Heart Balm Act).
17. Id.
18. Field v. McClernand, 3 I11. (2 Scam.) 79, 83, 84 (1839). See also City of Waukegan v.
Pollution Control Bd., 57 1Il.2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146 (1974); People v. Reiner, 6 Ill.2d 337,
129 N.E.2d 159 (1955).
19. See note 9 supra.
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Other cases reveal similar problems. In Brown v. Burdick,20 the
plaintiff'filed his suit on the last permissible day before the expiration
of the statute of limitations. He appeared only once thereafter to
challenge the defendant's motion to dismiss. After that appearance he
took no further action for four years and then appeared only to contest the dismissal of his suit for want of prosecution. Following this
were two last-minute attempts at reinstatement and an eleventh-hour
appeal. The plaintiff then waited almost a year before attempting to
refile shortly before the expiration of section 24a's one year extension.
The court found the plaintiff guilty of a lack of diligence, thus falling
squarely within the exception to section 24a, and therefore prohibited
21
him from refiling under the section.
In Sandman v. Marshall Field and Co.,22 the plaintiff's original
suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. After the first dismissal, the suit was refused reinstatement and the plaintiff took no appeal. It was not until a few days prior to the expiration of section
24a's one-year period, over seven years after the cause of action
arose, that the plaintiff filed his second suit under section 24a. The
plaintiff was found guilty of an extreme lack of diligence and was de23
nied a right to refile.
Such avoidable delays in prosecuting lawsuits adversely affect
defendants in several ways. First, delays by plaintiffs can increase
defendants' legal expenses. 24 Increased costs result, for example,
when a defendant's lawyer either appears unprepared or fails to appear altogether. 2 5 Second, litigation involves psychological costs.
The need to retain counsel, prepare a defense, respond to discovery
20. 16 II1. App.3d 1071, 307 N.E.2d 409 (2d Dist. 1974).
21. The court concluded:
These acts are not those of the diligent plaintiff whom the legislature intended to
protect by section 24. Plaintiff's actions have not been compatible to the purpose
and intent of the statute and his conduct falls within the exception of extreme and
self-initiated delay.
Id. at 1074, 307 N.E.2d at 412.
22. 27 I11.
App.3d 427, 326 N.E.2d 514 (1st Dist. 1975).
23. The court concluded:
In our judgment ... the dismissals, and plaintiff's failure to appeal the denial of
reinstatement, are not indicative of the diligence required of a plaintiff who, in good
faith, invokes the jurisdiction of our courts and seeks the trial of a cause on its
merits.
It is now clear that section 24 of the Limitations Act is not a statute that confers an
absolute right to refile a suit after it has been dismissed for want of prosecution.
Id. at 431, 326 N.E.2d at 517.
24. Comment, Involuntary Dismissal for Disobedience or Delay: The Plaintiff's Plight, 34
U. CHi. L. REV. 922, 932 (1967).
25. Id. See also Hanson v. Firebaugh, 87 Idaho 202, 392 P.2d 202 (1964).
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orders and appear in court all involve great inconvenience. Moreover,
the uncertainty of the eventual result produces anxiety which could
be aggravated by delay. 2 6 Third, delay in prosecuting a lawsuit can
weaken the presentation of defenses because of the difficulty of preserving evidence with the passage of time. Physical evidence may
become lost or a valuable witness may die. 2 7 Often a plaintiff will
deliberately perpetuate a specious cause of action to improve his bar28
gaining position at settlement.
Under Franzese, these problems will most likely go without a remedy. The elimination of judicial discretion to create restrictions on
section 24a's right to refile allows a plaintiff to delay prosecution of
his suit needlessly and still be entitled to refile. The consequences for
defendants historically have been avoided by a remedial construction
of the section. Because Franzese overruled the judicially-created exception, defendants will have to find alternative means of protection.
LIMITED ALTERNATIVES FOR DEFENDANTS

Defendants have two limited alternatives to preclude plaintiffs from
refiling under section 24a. The first alternative is to have the plaintiff's suit dismissed for failure to comply with discovery orders pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21929 rather than dismissed for
want of prosecution. In 1974, the supreme court in Keilholz v.
Chicago and North Western Railway Co. 30 held that a dismissal

26. "[T] he plaintiff should not be allowed to subject the defendant to the psychological costs
of litigation for a needlessly long period of time." Comment, supra note 24, at 933.
27. Comment, supra note 24, at 934.
28. Id. at 935. See also Boling v. United States, 231 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1956); Sortino
v. Fisher, 20 App. Div.2d 25, 28, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186, 190 (1963).
29. A dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is authorized by ILL. SuP. CT. R.
219:
Rule 219. Consequences of Refusal to Comply with Rules or Orders Relating to
Discovery or Pre-trial Conferences.
(c) Failure to Comply with Order or Rules. If a party, or any person at the instance
of or in collusion with a party, unreasonably refuses to comply with any provision of
Rules 201 through 218, or fails to comply with any order entered under these rules,
the court, on motion, may enter, in addition to remedies elsewhere specifically
provided, such orders as are just, including, among others, the following:
(v) that, as to claims or defenses asserted in any pleading to which that issue is
material, a judgment by default be entered against the offending party or that his
suit be dismissed with or without prejudice; ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 219 (1968).
30. 59 Ill.2d 34, 319 N.E.2d 46 (1974).
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under rule 219 for failure to comply with discovery orders was not
3
the same as a dismissal for want of prosecution. '
The advantage to defendants is that rule 219 dismissals are unequivocally declared final according to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
273.32 Rule 273 declares that an involuntary dismissal, other than for
lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.3 3 In contrast,
a suit that has been dismissed for want of prosecution is exempted
from the operation of rule 273 and may be refiled under section
24a. 3 4 Therefore, defendants should seek rule 219 dismissals instead
of dismissals for want of prosecution to cut off plaintiff's attempt to
refile.
This alternative route, however, has its problems. The dismissals
under rule 219 by their very'nature will not be available unless a
plaintiff fails to comply with a discovery order.3 5 Furthermore, a
"reasonable relationship" must exist between the discovery sanction
and the violation on the part of the plaintiff.3 6 The drastic sanction
of involuntary dismissal must be reasonably related to serious and
unnecessary delay by the plaintiff. In the discovery process, therefore, defendants may be forced to settle for less drastic sanctions than
involuntary dismissal of the case.
31. The appellate court in Keilholz held that the penalties authorized under rule 219 were
essentially penalties "for want of prosecution" within the meaning of section 24a. 10 I11.
App.3d
1087, 1092, 295 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1st Dist. 1973). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed:
There is a sense in which every procedural rule and sanction, if it is to be viewed
from a sufficiently remote perspective, may be said to be designed to expedite the
prosecution of cases. But the focus of section 24 is narrow. It states with precision
the four types of orders with which it is concerned, and a dismissal for failure to
comply with an order of the court is not one of them. . . . [I]f all dismissal orders
entered under Rule 219 for failure to comply with discovery and pretrial conference
orders are to be considered as dismissals for want of prosecution under section 24,
the result would be to eliminate the most effective sanction for the disregard of
those orders.
59 Ill.2d at 37-38, 319 N.E.2d at 48.
32. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 273 provides, "Unless the order of dismissal or a statute of this State
otherwise specifies, an involuntary dismissal of an action, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 273 (1967).
33. Id.
34. The Illinois Supreme Court accomplished this by finding section 24a to be a statute
which "otherwise specifies" within the meaning of the opening clause of rule 273. Kutnick v.
Grant, 65 11.2d 177, 180, 357 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1976).
35. Savitch v. Allman, 25 Il.App.2d 864, 867-68, 323 N.E.2d 435, 438 (3d Dist. 1975). See
generally Kiely, Re-Discovering Discovery: A Fresh Look at the Old Hound, 10 J. MAR. J.
PRAC. & PROC. 197, 218-219 (1977).
36. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d 180, 197, 226 N.E.2d 6, 16 (1967); Department
of Transp. v. Zabel, 29 Ill. App.3d 407, 410, 330 N.E.2d 878, 880 (3d Dist. 1975).
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The second possible alternative method to avoid the consequences
of Franzese is to have a plaintiff's complaint dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b). 37 Since a dismissal
with prejudice is treated as an adjudication upon the merits, the right
to refile may be denied because the original controversy is res
38
judicata.
Unfortunately, this alternative method is inadequate for two
reasons. First, the rule 103(b) dismissal is available only in those
cases involving delay in service of summons. Second, for the suit to
be dismissed with prejudice, the plaintiff's delay in service upon the
defendant must have occurred after the statute of limitations had ex39
pired and must be found by the court to be unreasonable.
Thus, the rule 103(b) alternative, like that provided by rule 219, is
limited in its scope. Most defendants will be unable to avoid the
harassment, expense, and delay engendered by the elimination of
section 24a's diligence requirement.
RECOMMENDATION

One possible approach to the problems created by Franzese is
legislative amendment of section 24a to include a diligence requirement.4 0 This would relieve defendants of the consequences fostered
by dilatory plaintiffs. A better approach, however, is to restore the

37. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 103(b) provides:
Dismissal for Lack of Diligence. If the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence
to obtain service prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the
action as a whole or as to any unserved defendant may be dismissed without prejudice. If the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service occurs after
the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal shall be with
prejudice. In either case the dismissal may be made on the application of any defendant or on the court's own motion.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 103(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
38. The phrase "with prejudice" has a widely known legal significance. A dismissal with
prejudice is as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had been prosecuted to a final
prosecution adverse to the complainant. Gonzalez v. Gonzales, 6 I11.
App.2d 310, 314, 127
N.E.2d 673, 675 (1st Dist. 1955).
39. The Illinois Supreme Court recently pointed out that a dismissal with prejudice may be
entered under rule 103(b) only when the failure to provide service occurred after the statute of
limitations had run. Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Corp., 66 Ill.2d 613, 619, 363 N.E.2d 796, 795
(1977). Moreover, Justice' Dooley indicated that "Rule 103(B) should be employed with restraint. It should not be used as a vehicle to dispose of litigation." Id. at 621, 363 N.E.2d at 799
(Dooley, J., specially concurring). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 103(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1977) (committee commentary).
40. In H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (Tent. ed. 1958) the authors refer to the

plain meaning doctrine as the "flaggellant theory of statutory interpretation." They question the
effectiveness of a sanction that attempts to discipline the present lawmaking body for gaps of
interpretation left by past legislatures. Id. at 99-100.
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remedial construction that the section has received over the years.4 x
Such a liberal interpretation is viewed by scholarly authority as essential to enlightened judicial decisionmaking. 42 Moreover, the legislature itself has decreed that the remedial approach is preferred in the
interpretation of statutes.4 3 This viewpoint provides more flexibility
to the courts to fashion their own basis for the diligence requirement.

41. See, e.g., Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Corp., in which Justice Dooley in a specially concurring opinion concluded that section 24a is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed.
66 Ill.2d at 622, 363 N.E.2d at 799. This is a possible attempt to ameliorate the impact of
Franzese's plain meaning approach.
42. The concept of innovative judicial interpretation is widely supported. As explained by
Justice Holmes, the basic function of the judiciary is to fill the gaps of interpretation left by the
legislature after passage of the statute. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917),
Holmes in dissent declared that judges must legislate, but they do so within limits: "I recognize
. .. that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined
from molar to molecular motions." Id. at 221.
The separation of powers rationale for the plain meaning rule is inconsistent with this concept
of judicial legislation. The rule is based on the assumption that judges can exercise no legislative
power. Cardozo, however, recognized that the exercise of legislative powers by a judge was a
necessary adjunct of enlightened judicial interpretation. He explained that a judge is impelled
to seek and define the proper interstitial limits of his decision-making power. He called this
process an "interstitial" approach to decision-making, in which the function of judges is to fill the
interstices (or gaps) in the law through a carefully reasoned process of judicial interpretation. B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 15-18 (1921). The guiding force in this
process is called a "stream of tendency," a concept which is shaped by inherited instincts,
traditional beliefs, and acquired convictions about the proper boundaries to judicial legislation.
Id.at 11-12.
The plain meaning rule, by requiring a rigid interpretation of any given set of words, is too
inflexible to reconcile with Cardozo's approach. Cardozo wrote that the process of statutory
interpretation is guided not by rules of construction but by judges' innate sense of what the law
should be. This consideration by judges of larger factors than the plain and ordinary meaning is
called the "Method of Sociology." Important social interests, rather than rigid rules of construction, shape the progress of the law: "logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law. Which of these factors shall dominate in any case, must depend largely upon
the comparative importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted or
impaired." Id. at 112. The Method of Sociology is "the arbiter between other methods [of
statutory interpretation] determining in the last analysis the choice of each, weighing their competing claims, setting bounds to pretensions, balancing and moderating and harmonizing them
all." Id. at 98.
Dean Pound expounded the philosophy of "judicial empiricism." As suggested by the title,
this theory posits that courts should be given leeway to interpret the law as sufficiently elastic to
meet changing conditions, even though that process is tantamount to lawmaking by judicial
decision. E. POUND, SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 181-83 (1921).
43. Scholarly authority is not alone in recognizing the necessity of judicial legislation. The
legislature itself has declared for the courts a policy of liberal and remedial interpretation of
statutes. As is stated in the interpretive provisions of the Illinois Revised Statutes: "All general
provisions, terms, phrases and expressions shall be liberally construed in order that the true
intent and meaning of the General Assembly may be fully carried out." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
131, § 1.01 (1975).
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Under a liberal rule of construction, the standards for refiling
under section 24a can be carefully considered and articulated in case
law. It should be the court's judgment as to what constitutes serious
and aggravated delay by the plaintiff. Even if the legislature created
its own diligence requirement in section 24a, the duty of differentiating between delay that was serious enough to fit within the exception to section 24a and delay that justified only the original DWP
would still fall upon the courts.
CONCLUSION

Judicial recognition of the diligence requirement is justified when
one considers the costs to defendants in terms of expense, harassment
and weakened bargaining position at settlement. 44 These adverse
consequences for defendants are caused by the Franzese court's reliance on the plain meaning rule as the sole basis of the decision. The
plain meaning rule is too superficial in its rationale and too inflexible
in its approach to survive for long as the rule of decision in section
24a cases. 4 5 Furthermore, this static view of a court's interpretive
role is unsupported by case law 46 and scholarly authority. 47 A liberal
and remedial construction must be restored to section 24a.
Paul Caghan
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notes 19-28 and accompanying text supra.
notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
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